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Since the events of September 11th 2001 much as been written on how the construction 
of the terrorist threat post-9/11 contributed to the legitimising and use of 
extraordinary practices outside of the traditional boundaries of legal and, indeed, 
security practice. Much of this literature has focussed on the violation of the human 
rights of individuals caught up in the web of practices ranging from extraordinary 
rendition to targeted assassination to military intervention. Simultaneously a growing 
literature has drawn attention to the low key risk-based institutions and practices that 
have grown up around the ‘War on Terror’ such as the efforts against terrorist 
financing, the growing web of dataveillance and the emergence of risk management 
bureaucracies designed to calculate and manage risks to a tolerable level. This paper 
seeks to examine these latter discussions towards the concerns raised in relation to the 
less visible practices of counter-terrorism. What are the implications of the construction 
of risk-bureaucracies that operate on the logic of prevention and risk-management for 
our understandings of human rights? What accountability mechanisms are in place 
and how do they operate in practice? Given the complex and largely hidden nature of 
such regimes, the question of how we can reconcile them with the ideals of democratic 
and liberal societies is a pressing one, particularly as such structures once established 
may prove to be more long-lasting and have greater repercussions than the more 
controversial but visible practices mentioned above. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Since the events of September 11th 2001 much as been written on how the 
construction of the terrorist threat post-9/11 contributed to the legitimation and use of 
extraordinary practices outside of the traditional boundaries of legal and, indeed, 
security practice. Much of this literature has focussed, quite legitimately, on the 
violation of the human rights of individuals caught up in the web of practices ranging 
from extraordinary rendition to targeted assassination to military intervention. This 
discourse has viewed the ‘War on Terror’ as a threat to existing human rights 
standards and regimes and has attempted to articulate an alternative view of security 
that rejects the position that security somehow demands a restriction of liberty.1 
Simultaneously a growing literature has drawn attention to the low key risk-based 
institutions and practices that have grown up around the ‘War on Terror’ such as the 
efforts against terrorist financing, the growing web of dataveillance and the 
emergence of risk management bureaucracies designed to calculate and manage risks 
to a tolerable level.2 This paper seeks to draw connections between these two 
literatures by examining the human rights implications of the bureaucratisation of risk 
management strategies both at the domestic and international level in the area of 
counter-terrorism. It begins by locating human rights within Ulrich Beck’s concept of 
risk and, in particular, the role of globalization in rendering obsolete the sociological 
focus on group identities be they class or national. It will identify some tensions in 
Beck’s account of individualization as the basis for cosmopolitan action and the 
practice of risk-management. The paper will then turn to examine risk-management 
                                                 
1
 See for discussion Jeremy Waldron (2003) “Security and Liberty: The image of Balance” The Journal 
of Political Philosophy Vol 11 No 2 pp.191-210 
2
 See for example Louise Amoore and Marieke De Goede (2005) “Governance, risk and dataveillance 
in the war on terror” Crime, Law & Social Change Vol 43, pp.149-173 
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strategies in two areas – the Airport and the Main street – to examine how global risk 
management strategies impact on the everyday rights of individuals. 
Beyond individualization: Risk and human rights 
Before turning to a discussion of the interaction between Beck’s notion of 
cosmopolitanism and human rights, we first must address the political context in 
which that interaction takes place. We argue that increasing consciousness of risk 
propels the proliferation of risk management industries seeking to reduce these risks 
that capture the public imagination. Risk management industries are well-known in 
the financial and business world. In the field of government and regulation, the 
emphasis on managing all manner of risk too has also permeated the main 
bureaucratic tools of government. Yet some risks generate dedicated risk 
bureaucracies in attempts at better regulation, while other risks simply do not get the 
same attention. This results in a ‘concealed, responsive, self-politicisation of hazards 
in public perception, politics and the hazard bureaucracy’3 Beck’s argument suggests 
to us that increasingly government departments and regulatory agencies are assuming 
the form of a ‘risk bureaucracy’ dedicated to forecasting and developing risk-based 
guidelines to regulate and manage risks.  
Despite the ‘growing awareness of the globally interconnected form of threats, 
nation-states still provide key institutional contexts’ through which these risks are 
being constructed as well as regulated.4 As Giddens contended, states have and still 
are defined by their relative monopoly on administrative resources, technical 
expertise, bureaucratic intelligence and institutional influence. It is the very collective 
resources of government bureaucracies that Giddens described as the ‘administrative 
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 Ulrich Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, (Cambridge: Polity),1995, p.12 
4
 Mark Whitehead, ‘Cold Monsters and Ecological Leviathans: Reflections on the Relationships 
between States and the Environment’, Geography Compass, 2(2), 2008, p.415 
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power of the state’.5 While we accept that there are widely varying views of theories 
of the state in dealing with new global challenges, we are drawn here towards Beck’s 
suggestion that states are increasingly having to develop ‘risk bureaucracies’ to 
protect their populations from all manner of risk.6 We are more concerned with the 
ways in which risk has been bureaucratised into regulatory guidelines as states 
increasingly operate within complex global frameworks and engage with governance 
networks involving private corporations and civic groups. Risk and safety is seen as 
one of the major regulatory growth points for the ‘regulatory state’ in a risk society 
where the government’s role as regulator is advancing into new domains with the 
establishment of new risk bureaucracies and rules to manage risk.7 Comparisons can 
be made here with Weber’s famous ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy that operated 
according to a set of rules and procedures which made sense to bureaucrats and 
government. Consequently, human life became driven by efficiency, with ever more 
efficient rules devised for problem-solving purposes. The bureaucratisation of risk-
based guidelines means however that increasingly new rules and regulations are built 
around risk and the need to assess and reduce risk rather than resolve problems 
definitely. We should stress that what Beck envisions in the Risk Society is not so 
much the demise of states and their regulatory powers. Rather, he thinks that states 
can reinvigorate themselves in the process of managing risk. In this paper we are 
concerned with the implications of the emergence of this architecture of risk 
bureaucracy for human rights. Before turning to examine the practice of risk 
management, though, we first need to address how Beck envisioned the relationship 
between the Cosmopolitan condition and human rights. 
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 An initial point of clarification is required, particularly given the close 
association of Cosmopolitanism as a normative discourse and human rights in general. 
Beck uses the term in a number of specific ways8 that are best understood by starting 
with what it is he was trying to say with this new concept in Sociology. Beck’s 
argument was that contemporary societies have entered a second age of modernity 
that challenged the traditional sociological concepts of class and nationalism in 
particular. In place of these concepts he argues for a new Cosmopolitanism. There are 
two aspects to this Cosmopolitanism, on the one hand we have the ‘Cosmopolitan 
condition’ and on the other the ‘Cosmopolitan moment’. The former is a descriptive 
term which in turn justifies Beck’s insistence that Sociology move away from 
‘methodological nationalism’, the latter is a recognition of the normative possibilities 
that such a move opens both in terms of our understanding of society and how we 
might transform it. In Beck’s own words: 
“In order to unpack cosmopolitanism, we need to make another important 
distinction, namely that between normative-philosophical and empirical-
analytical cosmopolitanism; or to put it differently, between the cosmopolitan 
condition and the cosmopolitan moment.”9 
 
Thus cosmopolitan-realism, the sociological study of actually existing 
cosmopolitanism, is an analytical term that allows us to re-examine the world without 
falling victim to a reliance on ‘zombie’ categories such as household, class, family, 
public as they are conceived within methodological nationalism.10 This cosmopolitan-
realism is, then, a necessary but not sufficient condition for seizing the cosmopolitan 
moment and transforming society along normative-philosophical cosmopolitan lines.  
                                                 
8
 For a critical account of Beck’s usage see Calhoun, Craig (2010) “Beck, Asia and the second 
modernity” The British Journal of Sociology Vol 61 No 3, pp.597-619 
9
 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (2010) “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a 
research agenda” The British Journal of Sociology Vol 61 No 1, p..386 
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 At the root of this is the structural transformation of society in the second 
modernity away from class based societies towards ones where individuals are best 
understood as disembedded from traditional social forms and commitments and 
instead they 
“must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves”11 
Thus, the attachments, loyalties and sense of self of individuals cannot be taken for 
granted to break on artificially imposed national lines. Instead individuals find 
themselves both temporally and spatially dislocated and ultimately are responsible for 
relocating themselves within this global or cosmopolitan reality.12 It is in this sense 
that methodological nationalism produces ‘zombie’ categories that lead sociologists to 
place individuals in pre-existing categories that bear little or no resemblance to their 
lived experience. It is also within this individualisation of social experience that Beck 
roots his arguments for a cosmopolitan human rights regime as  
“If human rights come to be understood as the necessary basis of an increasing 
number of individuals’ autonomy, these people will ‘feel’ that they are 
defending the foundations of their own identities when they defend the 
importance of human rights for foreigners and strangers. The cultural and 
political diversity that is essential to this kind of life has been slowly elevated to 
a central political principle”13 
 
It is in this sense that Beck’s claim that human rights-international law represent a 
‘kind of civil religion of modern cosmopolitanism’14 in that international human 
rights regimes are a product of the tension between the continued institutional 
structure of the state and the increased individualisation of subjects whose lived 
biographies transcend arbitrary state lines. Thus cosmopolitan structural change is the 
product of the interplay of the structural constraints of the first and second 
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 Beck as quoted in Will Alkinson (2007) “Beck, individualization and the death of class: a critique” 
The British Journal of Sociology Vol 58 No 3, p.352 
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modernities to produce new institutional structures, as Beck puts it in the context of 
ecological risks: 
“This demonstrates that the everyday experience of cosmopolitan 
interdependence is not a mutual lover affair. It arises in a climate of heightened 
global threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to cooperate. With the 
conceptualisation and recognition of threats on a cosmopolitan scale, a shared 
space of responsibility and agency bridging all national frontiers and divides is 
created that can (though it need not) found political action among 
strangers…This is the case when recognition of the scale of the common threats 
leads to cosmopolitan norms and agreements and thus to an institutionalised 
cosmopolitanism.”15 
 
Again here we see the interplay of the empirical and normative aspects of Beck’s 
cosmopolitanism. The objective conditions of cosmopolitanism create the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of an international human rights regime rooted in the 
recognition of individual freedom but its realization is a product of actual political 
struggles in the context of the second modernity. Beck himself gives the case of 
Western states adopting the banner of human rights to legitimise military 
interventions as one example of how such a struggle may produce undesirable results. 
His solution is that: 
“in the spirit of Kant,…a transnational legal order [be created], which, among 
other things, excludes the possibility of interventions being decided and carried 
out unilaterally by the hegemonic military power and its allies.”16 
 
Thus Beck’s cosmopolitan realism points towards the recognition of international 
human rights standards as a desirable institutional response to the process of 
individualisation in the second modernity. Before turning to map how these human 
rights standards are affected by the risk-management of terrorism on a global scale 
two key issues need to be addressed. First, in some ways a recognition of the success 
of and a response to the global human rights regime, is the privatisation of risk 
management away from sovereign power and therefore in some ways bypassing the 
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existing human rights regime which as Beck states is ‘against the sovereignty of 
individual states.’17 Second, to what extent is Beck’s notion of ‘individualisation’ 
itself a ‘zombie’ category that impedes our capacity to understand the challenges to 
contemporary human rights regimes? 
 Beck is correct to point towards the creation of international human rights 
regimes as a positive response to the challenge of the second modernity, he is also 
correct to highlight the danger that this ‘transnational humanism can easily turn into a 
military humanism’18 but one aspect that is less addressed is the effect the growing 
privatisation of aspects of states roles, which itself is a response to the cosmopolitan-
condition as well as a deliberate response to the specific challenge of global human 
rights regimes, has on the practice and protection of human rights themselves. De 
Londras outlines four developments that have complicated this matter. First, is the 
securitization of world politics after-9/11 that legitimised the restriction of human 
rights or even in certain case, as she puts it, led to human rights ‘sacrifice’ in the name 
of security.19 The second dynamic is the de-statification of sovereign performance or 
put more simply the private operation of sovereign functions from security provision 
to border control. Thirdly, the corporatization of sovereign performance. Transferring 
to corporate entities various sovereign implementation mechanisms from prisons to 
extraordinary rendition. And finally, the disembodiment of human rights by extending 
aspects of human rights frameworks to legal persons such as companies.20 The net 
effect of these four developments has been to result in: 
“a situation where states have heavy rights-protecting burdens in their 
performance of sovereignty but are enabled to ‘off-load’ at least some of those 
burdens by means of privatisation to corporations that are imbued with both 
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human and corporate rights but perform sovereignty without being limited by 
the kinds of rights-protection burdens that inhibit state action.”21 
 
Thus, states have a line of escape from the imposition of human rights regimes which 
in Beck’s formulation act against sovereign power. And one which we shall see that 
has been frequently used. Furthermore, although private actors are regulated in 
accordance with human rights obligations: 
“that requirement is of little utility where such privatisation is undertaken with 
the purpose of evading human rights.”22 
 
 As mentioned above, Beck argues that states can reinvigorate themselves through the 
deployment of risk management strategies. Ironically, in this case this reinvigoration 
takes the form of the privatization of certain aspects of sovereign performance in 
order to evade restrictions on sovereign practice by international human rights 
regimes. In this way, similar to the practice of ‘policy laundering’23, human rights 
violations at the states behest are laundered through private actors to avoid 
repercussions for the sovereign and protection for the individual. What is emerging in 
the ‘War on Terror’ then is what Beck would term a ‘deformed cosmopolitanism’, as 
the cosmopolitan moment is not seized to achieve the normatively desirable outcome 
but instead is used by states to abuse and extend their power against the individual. 
Cosmopolitan realism though is a necessary prerequisite to adequately capture and 
analyse this dynamic. 
 A second line of escape though goes more to the heart of Beck’s conceptual 
model and that is the challenge posed to the concept of the subject or individual at the 
base of Beck’s, and others, model of human rights in a cosmopolitan world by the 
emergence of bureaucratised risk-management strategies. Beck’s concept of rights 
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building from the individual is fundamentally Kantian in form. One line of criticism 
would be to follow Levinas, and argue that Kant’s self-regarding cosmopolitanism is 
flawed in that it relies on mutual recognition and therefore is susceptible to radical 
discourses of exclusion where the self dehumanises the other, thereby legitimising 
violent practices.24 However, we’d like to focus on the challenge posed more 
specifically to the Beck’s concept of individualisation as the basis for a human-rights 
regime in a risk-managed cosmopolitan world. As mentioned above, there has been 
much discussion of extreme human rights violations such as internment and 
extraordinary rendition, howeve as Amoore and de Goede have noted: 
“The war on terror involves the classification, compilation and analysis of data 
on, for example, passenger information and financial transactions on an 
unprecedented scale. These techniques of governance rely heavily on 
sophisticated computer technology and complex mathematical modelling to 
mine data and single out suspicious behaviour.”25 
 
A straightforward question follows from this, to what extent are human rights regimes 
capable of dealing with potential violations of rights that not only may be operated by 
the private sphere but also deal not with pre-existing unitary subjects but rather with 
abstract sets of potential risk factors which in turn are used to produce risky 
subjects.26 Insofar as Beck’s subjects remain free to construct their biographies 
uninhibited by such techniques then it is unclear where the form of resistance to 
human rights violations will, or even can, emerge. The problem for Beck is that the 
same processes of cosmopolitanism that produce individualisation also challenge the 
concept of the unitary universal subject. In a sense Beck is guilty of the crime he 
accuses others in sociology of being guilty – namely the insistence on the use of 
                                                 
24
 See David Campbell (1999) “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida and Ethics 
after the end of philosophy” in David Campbell & Michael Shapiro (eds) Moral Spaces: Rethinking 
Ethics and World Politics Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
25
 Amoore and de Goede, op. cit., 2005,  p.151 
26
 Amoore and De Goede for example deal with the US VISIT programme which they describe as ‘a set 
of techniques for regulating mobility, in which private risk experts are authorised to identify and target 
risky persons’. Ibid p.151 
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categories that may no longer be appropriate in a cosmopolitan moment, in this case 
the individual as an agent rather than as a product of global governance forces. An 
alternative approach would be to a take more biopolitical line on subjectivity where: 
“the self is coerced into existence, not to become an agent but as a mechanism 
of control where systems of discourse work from inside out by creating a self-
regulating subject”27 
 
The critical issue here is that Beck, and other discourses of human rights, focus on 
individual autonomy opens up rather than forecloses the possibilities for human rights 
violations in a risk society by allowing such violations the space to escape the human 
rights discourse completely by not targeting individuals per se but instead shifting the 
debate to depoliticised concepts such as data-protection. In terms of human rights 
then, we can draw a parallel to the conventional model of risk. As Calhoun puts it: 
“The basic issue is that while the whole populations bear risks, only some of 
their members bear the actual loss and suffering.”28 
 
Similarly, all of our rights are under threat through the growing risk bureaucracy but 
only some individuals will bear the full (or any) cost of these violations when they 
become inscribed on their bodies via extraordinary rendition, internment or 
‘enhanced’ interrogation methods. Thus, just as rights-violation laundering occurs 
through the use of private actors so too are violations concealed by targeting not 
individual humans per se but rather aspects of their behaviour recorded in ever 
expanding databases of state and private actor alike. The question now  turns to what 
extent is the above an accurate characterisation of the performance of existing risk 
bureaucracies and secondly, what transformation of the existing human rights 
discourse needs to occur to create both the language and space to identify, understand 
and possibly resist these encroachments. 
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 Callero, Paul (2003) “The Sociology of the Self” Annual Review of Sociology Vol 29, p.118 
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Dataveillance at the Airport 
Since 9/11, the airport has been recognised as a critical site for the intersection 
between the emerging global security architecture and individual citizens. This is not 
only due to the specific nature of the 9/11 attacks but also as Salter notes: 
“Few sites are more iconographic of both the opportunities and the 
vulnerabilities of contemporary globalization”29 
 
For present purposes, contemporary globalization can here be read as a euphemism 
for the cosmopolitan-condition. That said, on closer examination, the emerging 
security architecture governing aviation security regimes is emblematic of a deformed 
cosmopolitanism rooted in the articulation of state interests rather than an adequate 
response to the cosmopolitan moment. The US National Strategy for Aviation 
Security called for a: 
“risk-based, cross-discipline, and global approach to aviation security”30 
Similarly, the global private airline trade body, International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) too recommended a risk-based approach to setting common 
standards,   
The next step is for governments to harmonize a risk-based approach to 
security…. We need a constant level of vigilance that is constantly adjusted to 
deal with specific threats or events. To achieve this, we must develop a common 
risk-assessment methodology.31 
 
Indeed, IATA has consistently promoted ‘a risk-based approach to security among 
governments, developing a common risk-assessment methodology’.32 The EU has 
been engaged in the construction of the first transnational aviation security regime 
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 Mark Salter, Ed.(2008) Politics at the Airport Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press p.IX 
30
 The White House National Security Strategy for Aviation Security Section II, ‘Risk Methodology’, 
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 12 
extending to both EU member states and beyond to the members of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference.33 However, these efforts have remained piecemeal and 
incomplete in terms of creating a viable standardised and global aviation security 
regime. Rather what we see is tensions emerging between national and/or regional 
jurisdiction over standards, practices and regulations. Of particular interest to the 
present paper is though the increased use of ‘dataveillance’ to identify risky 
individuals and prevent or at least closely monitor their use of aviation and the extent 
to which this approach opens another line of escape from overarching human rights 
standards.  
Dataveillance can be defined as the “the proactive surveillance of suspect 
populations, to identify ‘risky groups of people’ for the purposes of ‘targeted 
governance.’”34 The techniques deployed range from the technological to behavioural 
observation by airport security personnel35 and are focussed on allowing authorities to 
break "the individual up into a set of measurable risk factors."36 Much of the legal and 
human rights discourse on aviation security regimes has focussed on the (mis)use of 
watch lists as the main organ of passenger surveillance with a particular focus on false 
positives and the lack of due process.37 In the US aviation watch-lists are maintained 
by the FBI in their Terrorist Screening Database.38 The UN also maintains lists of 
suspect individuals and organisations under the auspices of the UN’s Al-Qaeda and 
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 See Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 and the updated Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008 both available at 
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Taliban Sanctions committee established by UNSC Res 1267.39 Largely due to the 
relatively arbitrary nature of such lists, problems of transliteration and a number of 
cases of mistaken identity, international governments have increasingly sought 
alternatives to the watch list approach. As Bennett has noted: 
“One FBI agent described the initial screening process as a ‘massive data dump’ 
of anybody with a connection to terrorism, which the TSC [the Terrorist 
Screening Centre at the FBI] has been trying to clean up ever since”40 
 
Although despite this caveat, the implementation and effectiveness of such lists is 
dependent on the willingness of a variety of civil society actors to cooperate with 
enforcement.41   
 Of more interest to this paper is the large scale collection and analysis of data on 
passengers that has been developed in aviation security regimes ranging from 
requirements for biometric security features on passports, Passenger name records 
(PNR’s), finger printing at border access points  and behavioural observation. The 
purpose of these data collection and control techniques operate to effectively break 
each ‘individual into a set of measurable risk factors.’42 Increasingly air travellers are 
subjected to a dense web of social control as they pass through the variety of security 
assemblages both physical and electronic. Despite the obvious implications for 
Human Rights, as Salter has noted, 
“the public imaginary has become fixated on the inconveniences of travel and 
not on the increased securitization of everyday life.”43 
 
In particular, by linking these large databases containing passenger information to 
other law enforcement and intelligence databases allows the creation and maintenance 
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 UNSC Press Release http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8102.doc.htm 
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of profile information for all passengers that enter the system, in some cases 
indefinitely. In the US this has taken the shape of the new US VISIT programme, a 
database that links more than 20 existing databases with a view to "weeding out" 
criminals and terrorists. Some of the databases linked include IDENT, the automatic 
fingerprint id storing biometric data on all foreign visitors, immigrants and asylum 
seekers; ADIS storing entry and exit data; APIS storing passenger manifest 
information; SEVIS storing information on exchange and foreign students in the US; 
IBIS a watch list linked to Interpol and national crime data; CLAIMS 3 a database 
holding information on foreign nationals claiming benefits "and an array of links to 
local law enforcement, financial systems and educational records."(Ibid, 162) The 
goal of linking such information is to be able to categorise and identify people by 
their degree of "riskiness." (Ibid, 162) In the EU, US demands for greater access to 
passenger information was quite contentious. After a period of negotiations the EU 
and the US signed an agreement on the sharing of PNR's with 34 pieces of data to be 
shared. However this agreement was struck down by the European Court of Justice in 
May 2006, and has since been replaced with an interim and further long term 
agreement in July 2007. The amended agreement reduces the number of elements to 
be shared to 19 to comply with EU privacy laws. Even so the data to be transferred 
contains quite comprehensive information, as the EU faq on the topic note that: 
"The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)…will filter out and 
not use sensitive information, save in exceptional cases where life is at 
risk. Sensitive information means data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership or concerning the health or sex life of the individual"44 
 
Even though EU data protection laws are more robust than in the US, similar moves 
towards the creation of databases and sharing of information have been taken. For 
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 EU FAQ on PNR, op cit. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/294&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN accessed 25/01/08  
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example the EU data retention Directive, which gives states until 2009 to comply, 
requires the collation and retention of internet and other communications data for a 
period ranging from six months to 2 years.45 When coupled with initiatives such as 
the proposed moves to an e-border system in the UK, the probability of an equivalent 
of the US VISIT programme emerging is quite high. Thus the individual traveller is 
sorted based on a variety of risk factors, and treated differentially based on these 
assessments. In the US the most recent developments include CAPPSII (Computer 
Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System) and the rolling out of ESTA (Electronic 
System for Travel Authorization) for visitors from visa-waiver countries.46 In the EU 
passenger profiles were already being checked against INTERPOL data and databases 
covering donations to proscribed or suspect organisations.47 Despite the serious 
privacy implications for these practices, as noted by Salter and mentioned above, the 
main complaint from passengers has been about the excessive delays these 
innovations have caused. Thus, the individual is only resistant insofar as their 
individualised biography is inconvenienced by the practices of aviation security. 
 An example of this is the additional security measures introduced at Heathrow 
for domestic and Irish travellers transferring from Terminal 1 to any of the 
international terminals. A photograph is taken of the passenger as they re-enter the 
airside part of the terminal. This picture is then encrypted and used to check against 
the passengers at various security check-points as they make their way across the 
airport. The photograph is then destroyed within 24 hours of the passenger leaving the 
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terminal.48 Unless a passenger actually commits an offence in the interim then the 
process represents nothing more than a minor delay, on the other hand while within 
the governance structure of the airport the passenger is continually surveilled and 
controlled in anticipation of a threat. Interestingly, a number of aviation security 
regimes have adopted an incentivisation approach to encourage passengers to avail of 
bypasses to these additional security measures at the airport by pre-registering as 
essentially ‘non-risky’ individuals. Programmes such as ‘Secure Flight’ in the US and 
‘Privium’ in Schippol airport in the Netherlands are examples of this.49 Similarly 
Heathrow has run a pilot in conjunction with the private consultancy Accenture of a 
passenger identification system called ‘miSense’. The system uses passenger 
fingerprints, iris scans and photographs as biometric identity markers to allow access 
through the airports security and border control.50 Interestingly the justification for the 
development of the process is put in terms of enhancing ‘passenger experience’. As 
BAA head of product development, Stephen Challis, puts it: 
“With miSense, we are investigating the very latest technologies, in 
collaboration with airlines and border control authorities, to improve passenger 
experience and identity security."51 
 
Accenture also cite a survey, albeit from a technology provider, that suggests 90% of 
passengers support the use of biometric data if it eases their passage and reduces 
delays at airports. Individuals then are willing to constitute themselves as non-risky 
subjects even if this involves a loss of privacy if they can reduce the minor 
inconveniences of airport security checks. The extensive governance of subjectivity 
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by the emerging aviation risk bureaucracy is then, becoming a normalised and 
accepted part of air travel with passengers less concerned about the loss of privacy or 
indeed, loss of liberty of others, than they are about convenience and access. The 
question now is to what extent are such mechanisms specific to the site of the airport 
or are they colonizing other aspects of society at large. 
Dataveillance on Main Street 
Understandably, much of the discussion of dataveillance post September 11th has 
focussed on the particular architecture of the airport. Nowhere else is the interaction 
between the individual and the bureaucratised counter-terrorist regime more obvious 
and far reaching. However it is worth considering to what extent the practices 
pioneered at the airport can become more widespread in society at large. Indeed there 
was a time when airport security was either essentially non-existent or only 
selectively applied.52 Similarly, travelling outside of the West the technologies 
familiar to us in the departure lounge are routinely used in other everyday 
circumstances. In New Delhi for example metal detectors are to be found at the 
doorway of every major hotel, place of worship and shopping mall and are virtually 
uncommented upon. Adding similar technology to public transportation networks in 
the West has been a recurrent feature of the post-9/11 security debate, with added 
urgency after the Madrid and London bombings. That said, metal detectors have only 
been used on a trial basis on the London tube network and even then, with a focus on 
knife crime rather than terrorism.53 Bar the extensive spread of CCTV, the visible 
architecture of security governance is yet to become commonplace in Western cities, 
                                                 
52
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despite this the hidden architecture of dataveillance and bureaucratic controls are 
arguably more extensive than is generally assumed to be the case.  
 O’Malley discusses the implications for the shift to technologically driven and 
risk inspired policing methods using the Deleuzian concept of ‘dividual’ to capture 
how the liberal (and risk-cosmopolitan) individual is fragmented into abstract factors 
for the purposes of targeted governance and the management of risk: 
“It is risk that is governed ‘through’ the policing of my dividual, appropriately 
enough because as a property of distributions, risk does not apply to individuals 
so much as to dividuals in the form of those statistical properties of individuals 
that are aggregate to form risk pools”54 
 
Although O’Malley was specifically discussing what he termed ‘simulated 
governance’ in relation to traffic offences, was using this to describe a more general 
transformation in governance that was, paraphrasing Foucault, designed: 
“to cause as little disturbance as possible to the circulation of valued bodies, 
utilities and things…and this to maximize ‘goog’ – desired – circulation and 
interfere only with ‘bad’ circulation”55 
 
We can similarly view the variety of structures, databases and practices that constitute 
the everyday risk management of terrorism as a set of tools, targeted not at the level 
of the liberal individual but rather at the ‘dividual’ aimed at managing the flow of 
circulation in specified risk pools be that in terms of populations in general or specific 
areas such as financial transactions. For example in the US a series of large databases 
have been constructed by a variety of law enforcement and security agencies. One 
such programme, TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice) collected 
information on thousands of American citizens involved in anti-war and anti-
government protests and shared this information across 28 government organizations 
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and over 3,500 officials.56 Although now defunct, the system was not abandoned due 
to civil liberty issues but rather because the agencies involved believed the analytical 
value of the data had declined.57 Similar systems have been explored in the EU as 
means for sharing both identification data and psycho-social profiling information.58 
The potential for such systems to infringe on civil liberties was captured in the case of 
a German sociologist, Adrej Holm, who was arrested as a result of a web based 
investigation by German authorities that identified similarities between his work and 
the writings of a group known as ‘militante gruppe.’  Although the charges were lifted 
by the German courts due to a lack of evidence59, this monitoring of open source data 
raises serious questions about freedom of speech in the context of dataveillance. 
Unlike at the airport, where the infringement of liberties is by its very nature 
acknowledged and transactional and avoidable, the spread of these practices to 
everyday governance raises questions about the extent to which individuals can 
escape these modes of governance and in the context of Beck’s process of 
individualisation will even want to so far as it does not impinge excessively on their 
personal biographies.  
 A more mundane example of this can be found in the practices of financial 
institutions in the practices relating to ‘Know your customer’ and suspicious 
transaction reports (STRs). The roots of these practices can be traced from the bank 
clerks desk to the global level via the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which has 
been responsible for developing new global counter the financing of terrorism (CFT) 
standards. The approach developed by the FATF deploys risk-based models as a 
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shared regulatory platform for discussion which seem, on the surface at least, to be 
providing the new consensus for governance that global governance theory suggests is 
crucial: Beck’s ‘risk-cosmopolitanism’ and enforced integration to avert shared risks 
come to mind. In practice these standards include new regulations, surveillance, 
detection, increased checks and hurdles for terrorist financing to cross, in the process 
altering terrorist operating capabilities and intentions, and reducing vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure. The FATF 40+9 Recommendations, which are characterised above all 
by its emphasis on risk: “customer risk profiles”; “risk management systems”; 
“operating on a risk-sensitive basis”; ‘lower risk categories’ are concepts liberally 
peppered throughout.60 Among others, it recommends legislating to make terrorist 
financing a crime, allowing freezing of terrorist assets, implementing due diligence 
and Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements for banks and other financial 
institutions, establishing a suspicious transactions reporting process, and sharing 
financial intelligence with foreign partners by setting up Financial Intelligence Units 
in countries worldwide. Critically, recommendation 14 includes a provision that 
financial personnel be legally compelled to not reveal to customers that an STR is 
being produced on their transaction.61 Thus customers are unaware of any engagement 
with the global Anti Money-Laundering (AML)/CFT regime unless charges are 
forthcoming. The influence of the FATF standards spreads beyond the various 
participating states as indicated by the fact that these Recommendations have been 
endorsed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 
benchmark global standards. UN Security Council Resolution 1617 in 2005 also 
‘strongly urges all member states to implement the comprehensive international 
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standards’ contained in FATF recommendations. These risk-based global norms are 
now providing a basis for negotiations with a range of partners initiated by FATF 
attempts to proliferate these common standards worldwide. After all, the FATF’s core 
activities revolved around a need to engage with stakeholders and partners throughout 
the world, and to promote global implementation of its standards. 
Similarly, under the Wolfsberg agreement, all major international banks set 
global standards for customer identification for AML purposes. Levi suggests these 
are not window dressing but rather the alignment of procedures is best practice in 
organised crime and corruption prevention. Even though these standards are private 
initiatives outside legal frameworks, media scrutiny has created reputational risks for 
banks to consider. 62 This process redeploys commercial risk techniques first 
pioneered in private financial markets in novel ways. Private data mining companies, 
including the British data mining companies Mantas and World-Check, have 
developed specialised software tools to be used by financial institutions to single out 
suspicious transactions. Data are now approached and analysed through risk-based 
calculative models that aim to identify suspicious transaction, populations and 
unusual activity, producing new spaces for governance.63 Critically again customers 
are treated ‘dividually,’ that is to say their differential treatment is determined by 
various risk factors combining objective and behavioural characteristics to 
appropriately sort international financial flows between risky and non-risky 
behaviour. As with the aviation sector, the link between agencies of the state and the 
private sector is crucial to the success of the CFT regime, and again investigative 
powers traditionally the preserve of the state have been transferred to private actors, in 
this case banks and other financial institutions.  
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Conclusion 
In 2002, the science fiction film Minority Report dealt with the issue of ‘Pre-crime’. 
The film, set in a not too distant future, examines a world where notions of privacy 
and risk are radically altered. The protagonist, John Anderton, is part of a police unit 
that uses information from three psychic siblings to apprehend murderers before the 
crime has been committed. Anderton is a strong advocate of this system. He also 
inhabits a world where biometrics are used by private companies to tailor street side 
advertisements and shop displays to the individual passing and where every aspect of 
life is networked into a constant web of surveillance. Further this lack of privacy is 
not presented as dystopian nor is it perceived as such by Anderton and his associates. 
Only when the psychics report that Anderton himself is going to commit a murder is 
the protagonist shaken from his complacent faith in the system and forced to question 
the ethics and justice of not only the ‘pre-crime’ system but the nature of freedom in a 
surveillance society. In a similar fashion the practices of dataveillance outlined above 
do not yet feature as a politicised aspect of our contemporary way of life. Additional 
security, biometrics, cctv surveillance are all increasingly accepted as the price of 
living in a world risk society, with the main debates relating to the inconvenience of 
such matters in our everyday lives. Furthermore, such practices are to a great extent 
optional, and therefore any resistance can simply be met with the response that no-one 
is forcing us to engage with these systems. However as O’Malley notes: 
“It is possible to escape a good deal of the associated governance literally by not 
buying into it. However, this escape can be achieved only at the cost of 
jeopardizing all those licensed ‘freedoms’ or ‘privileges’ that expose us to the 
telemetric monitoring devices immanent in the transactions and circulations of 
consumer societies”64 
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Thus the process of individualisation outlined by Beck in the second modernity, while 
formally granting us the freedom to resist these technologies of governance also 
forces us to choose between this freedom and the benefits of modern life – banking, 
aviation, even shopping. While individualisation re-locates our life narrative away 
from traditional concepts of class, family and nation and can lead, as outlined above, 
to a cosmopolitan human rights architecture it also creates a situation where those 
rights can be eroded from below the level of the individual, to that of the ‘dividual’ 
risk factor. This is not to say that we are facing a totalitarian future but that debates on 
rights in a world risk society need to take into account the transformed ways in which 
individuality is constituted and disrupted by the practices of risk governance and to 
re-politicise and debate the consequences for such practices for our understanding of 
human rights. In other words, we should not wait until, like John Anderton, we are 
fingered by the risk governance system and given 36 hours to save our skins before 
we challenge the lines of escape that governments have used to evade and launder the 
violation of aspects of our human rights. 
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